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December 2002
APA/SPSM

Faith and Science: Juan Luís Segundo On Religion and Science

First of all, it is clear that in reality the "religious" realm is generally a realm of *instrumentality* rather than a realm of value-structure. Secondly, it is clear that the "divine" character attributed to this instrumentality, however unwittingly, constitutes one of the most serious dangers facing human life. -- Fr. Juan Luís Segundo, S.J. from *Faith and Ideologies*¹

INTRODUCTION

Juan Luís Segundo's thinking and writing on the question of the nature of faith, the nature of ideologies, and the relationship between the two was terribly enigmatic. One can read through the relevant texts and emerge with only the most basic sense of his intentions or be overwhelmed by the unique ways in which this priest and theologian talked about religion. Mostly, the creativity was in the move from theology as metaphysics to social theory, but the passionate and involved way in which Segundo conceived the human project means the role of religious activists – if not theologians proper – is, in Segundo's terminology, to become “Artisans of a New Humanity.” And, to fully appreciate what Segundo meant one benefits from having access to his last book, *The Liberation of Dogma*. It is my contention that a full reading of Segundo's work reveals that he was saying that religion must become scientific, must adopt the methodology of the social sciences, in particular historical materialism.

Even early on, Segundo said that human interaction with the world and history requires that we learn more with each generation, indeed with each day, in order to be ever more successful in developing our humanity, and at this point in history this means a focus on liberation. Religion is the social system in which this interaction over time, and therefore in which the process of learning, takes place. The logical conclusion is that we are obliged – to ourselves – to make the most of the process; we must engage the world and ourselves

scientifically. In this regard he understood faith as the commitment to learn as one goes along. Ideologies – such as religion – then are the various approaches at knowledge and learning that human beings develop collectively, and when done with openness and honesty these ideologies are science, *Wissenschaft*. Or so I will try to demonstrate in what follows.

THEOLOGY

One commentator summed up Segundo's work like this:

In my view, Juan Luís Segundo seeks to liberate theology from the strictly metaphysical, to the thoroughly historical and political realm of human experience. In other words, Segundo seeks to liberate theology from itself, in the sense of breaking down the distinction between the metaphysical and historical planes of reality, with the result that all reality and human experience is situated within the historical and social realm of existence.²

In some sense Segundo was doing to theology what Karl Marx did to Hegelian philosophy, he was standing theology on its feet in order to make it useful for the human project of liberation. All of this follows from Segundo's methodology, which is based on a rejection of orthodoxy in favor of orthopraxy. One might say that Segundo was merely taking Marx seriously when he wrote that the point of philosophy is not to describe the world but to change it.³ Since people are social animals who exist in and through their collective activity, our lives are social, complex, interactive and therefore political (Aristotle, of course, said that first). Segundo's understanding of religion, as an ideology, was that it is a guide for this activity, a guide for living.

It is important to note that Segundo based his discussion of ideology on Marx, but was adopting an explicitly neutral use of the term similar to Karl Mannheim and, more directly, V.I. Lenin. For Marx, as is well know, ideology was a cover the ruling class used to justify its domination. For Segundo, as for Lenin, ideology is a term that is more akin to class-consciousness generally.⁴ The neutral use of the term comes from Lenin's political philosophy, and the way in which he conceived revolutionary struggle, as in *The State and Revolution*. In

this sense, all human activity requires analysis of the situation, decisions on how to proceed, etc. The point being that the collective activity of the revolutionary class requires an ideology, a comprehensive understanding of the situation and the necessary praxis given present historical realities.

For Segundo, religion is an ideology. And herein lies the rub, as they say, if religion is this kind of class conscious ideology directed towards liberation, then it is – or at least should be – science in the way Marx and Frederick Engels understood historical materialism to be a science. Segundo did not say that religion should be identical to historical materialism, but in as much as religion should be like a social science at all, it comes to resemble historical materialism because of the commitment to liberation and the working class perspective. This perspective, I think, is faith, as Segundo understood that term.⁵ As far as religion is Christian religion the faith is a commitment to love one another – what the Marxists would call solidarity. "What remains approximates a critical social theory with a strong Christian ethical substrate, which in turn rests upon the gospel imperative to love thy neighbor."⁶

But there is a difficulty in all this, in that Marx and Engels were very critical of the inclusion of values in the struggle for socialism. In his own time, Engel's little book *Socialism: Utopian and Scientific* made this argument widely known.⁷ Historical materialism, as a science, looks to the ways in which history moves, understood "objectively" through the methodology of science.⁸ Socialism may be about justice, but the struggle itself must be scientifically grounded in order to succeed in the most efficient manner. Or so the argument goes. Segundo is challenging all of this by arguing that our ideologies are necessarily connected to our faith.⁹ The struggle for justice may be scientifically understood and advanced, but it is also ultimately about our human desire for justice. Personally, I think Segundo makes a very good case for this

connection and it cannot be doubted that if people had no desire for justice there would be no class struggle; people would simply accept class domination.¹⁰ But people do expect and fight for justice, so human values are part of the equation, part of the dialectical complexity of the movement of history. That said, Engels' point had more to do with faith-based socialism in the more traditional sense of faith (Utopian Socialism), as in waiting for God to bring justice down from heaven. Engels was arguing for a scientifically organized and historically informed human struggle for justice rather than mere good intentions. Segundo was simply adopting the understanding of ideology advanced by Lenin using the language of faith.¹¹ Faith is dialectically connected with ideology, so the historical project for social change must then be guided by both the ideology of that change as well as the valuation of justice, and the faith commitment to the science. The struggle rests on the human value of justice, faith in the human capacity to learn how to apply that value in different situations at different times, and the historically developing ideologies applying that value in light of that faith at different times and places.

For Segundo all of this was clear, and was theology in some sense of the word. Theology has just been brought down out of the clouds and in Segundo's hands became a tool for human living, focused on human experience and human values. This appears to have been his theological project. His claim was that "faith relates to values-structure as its grounding, or as its hope in itself, in the sense that 'in the end it will be seen that it was better to act' in accordance with a particular value-structure."¹² That superior values-structure was, for that Christian theologian, a Christian value: love one another.¹³ And it is absolute, but not universal. These values-structures, or more simply values, are absolute for the person who holds them but others may choose other values.

But we are talking about religion, and some would say religion cannot liberate. Quite famously, Marx wrote: "The abolition of religion as the *illusory* happiness of people is a demand for their *real* happiness. The call to abandon their illusions about their condition is a *call to abandon a condition that requires illusions*."¹⁴

Thus, even when religion embraces the cause of the oppressed, in Marx's view it still functions as an ideological barrier to the formation of a practical, revolutionary class consciousness, inspiring human beings to fight their oppressors in a condition of ignorance, rather than from a position based upon a scientific knowledge of society.¹⁵

However, my opinion is that Segundo was working with a radically different understanding of religion. This understanding was extremely creative in that he articulated a vision of religion and the place for commitment to it using a model more associated with secular theorists like Clifford Geertz and Peter Berger.¹⁶ Segundo, at times, claimed his religion, or ideology, was superior. The question of superiority was for him practical, not metaphysical. An ideology is superior because it is more effective, by virtue of scientifically describing reality and offering a praxis that can ultimately succeed in making real historical change. Segundo's Christianity is superior, in short, because historical materialism as a science is superior and Segundo's Christianity is one very interesting way to make use of historical materialism. He offers the values of the Christian as the approach but recognizes as well that other people approach Marxism from other, although obviously similar, values-structures. In the simplest terms, there is a straightforward analytic argument to make that since Segundo's theology has nothing to say about God it is not theology. It is I think an involved discussion of religion in a way that would satisfy Marx, in that this is a religion that has adopted Marx's scientific method and has given up traditional religion's focus on a divine other.¹⁷

As I said, Segundo claimed that praxis is its own measure: if it liberates it works. From his point of view, what else is there? And I would argue that was the core of Segundo's move to

science: observe and test. The test is does it liberate. In Segundo's view to test the praxis against some metaphysical value would miss the point and inevitably cause greater suffering – this argument strikes me as eminently convincing given the suffering justified on theological grounds throughout history. In fact, Segundo made that exact point in his own discussion of these issues.¹⁸ It is all the more convincing because his Christianity is of absolute value only to Christians and makes no universal claim, as an ideology. But there is one part of this that does make a universal claim, that part is faith.

FAITH

Segundo's most fundamental statement about faith is that it is essentially a living and dynamic commitment on the part of the human being rather than a 'possession' or 'deposit' consisting of formulas and creeds which require preservation and to which the individual returns for repeatable solutions when confronted with the struggles of life.¹⁹

So faith is not a kind of fundamental trust in reality but a commitment to learning what reality has to teach.²⁰ Faith is, in one of Segundo's classic phrases, a learning to learn, and most importantly here faith is communicated in the realm of iconic language rather than digital language.²¹ Let me unpack that. Writing a paper on this subject, or for Segundo writing a book, is inherently limited because in these forms one uses digital language. Digital language is the language of straightforward prose, it is logical and in theory consistent. Iconic language is the language of poetry, of images, and of faith.²² Segundo's point, borrowed from Gregory Bateson, was that iconic language multiplies the information communicated, thus the power of poetry. And as a result of this increased power to communicate, iconic language is the way in which we communicate values. And where iconic language expresses our values, digital language is needed to express what Segundo called "transcendent data," meaning our conceptions of reality or metaphysics.

Faith gives us some sense of what should be and that is judged against what is, the transcendent data. But since faith is expressed iconically it can only be judged existentially. Ideology, in particular science, is expressed digitally and so can only be judged logically. But these things interact dialectically.

The language of faith, then, is a dialectic involving our notions of how things "ought to be" and our notions of how things "in the ultimate instance" really are. Thus all faith statements necessarily conjoin a particular interpretation of reality with the implications of that interpretation for concrete human life and praxis.²³

Most importantly here, things ought to be just, and this is basic to how humans experience reality.

What often confuses people is the relationship between what is and what we want. According to dialectics, reality is always a curious mixture of what is and what we want it to be. As Engels explained it, reality is matter in motion, or more properly stated in a post-quantum mechanics world, I should say that reality is matter undergoing constant change. Because our reality is socially constructed, our own behavior forms part of the immediate data. What we want and what we do is part of the dialectical process of reality. So we have both notions of reality as it is and reality as we would like it to be. As we act to bring about some coincidence between what we take as given and what we want, the nature of what really is changes because we are part of the totality of change that reality undergoes constantly. Therefore, to say what *is*, is not really possible, one can say what was and what we think or hope will be, but what *is* changes as we say it. I think Segundo is explaining all of this in the language of theology, in a way that embraces the dialectical nature of reality and self-consciously involves itself in history, which is to say the human side of reality.

I am convinced that what Segundo was articulating was an understanding of how people go about engaging dialectical reality in a way that appreciates the human interest in what

otherwise seems like an "objective reality."²⁴ What we think is impacts what we want, what we want influences what we do, and what we do changes what is, which then changes what we want, and so on. The obvious difficulty, which is obvious to anyone familiar with dialectical philosophy, Taoism, or Quantum Mechanics, is that reality also changes of its own accord, and resists human attempts to mold it to exactly fit our wishes. So the complexity is two-fold, on the human scale the ruling class resists efforts to construct a more just society directly, and on an ontological level reality itself resists in a purely dialectical fashion -- meaning that most of our efforts have effects that we never contemplated.

To some it seems that Segundo was left with faith as merely an inspirational force, a good intention. But the complexity of the dialectic is that the intention actually is part of reality, and comes from reality. Our activity, motivated by intentions, is part of what is. Faith as mere intention would be external to reality, like a view in upon it. This misses the point that we are involved in reality, not spectators of it. And in a related way, as I mentioned above, one can interpret faith, in Segundo's sense, as an aspect of class-consciousness – as the class location and identification aspect of class-consciousness. Faith is not just a good intention, it is a social and political location; so if history and politics were ontological for Segundo then this faith is properly ontological in that it is an expression of our being, qua social and historical subjects.

MARXISM

Segundo devoted a good deal of space to an analysis of the question of whether science is an ideology, and can ideologies be scientific. In that discussion he focused on Marx's own arguments and those of later, mostly European Marxist theoreticians. Segundo's point, in the end, was that when Marx claimed to have subjected economics to the rigor of the natural sciences he was mistaken. Actually the mistake is two-fold, in the first case Segundo argued that

the natural sciences are not ideologically neutral in spite of their claims, and second that economic science in particular is not as rigorous as Marx believed at the time.²⁵

Segundo's point was not about science as science, but concerns the issue of the divorce of ideology and science. Segundo accepted that historical materialism is science; he simply argued that the science of history and all science are their own forms of ideology and therefore relate to issues of faith.²⁶ Marx wanted to believe that the science of history, his science of history, did not depend upon the values of the investigator. It is that contention that Segundo disputed. As he explained it:

Such ["objective"] science would be part of "ideology" [in the generic sense] only to the extent that anything, depending on its own particular characteristics, can be *used* as an instrument by conscious beings endowed with will and the ability to plan things out. What would be "ideological" [in the pejorative sense] in such a case would be a particular "use" of science, based on values alien to science itself.²⁷

His ultimate point being that science, like any human endeavor, is related to our values. One cannot claim to be doing something completely objective and have that mean that all human values have been removed.

In this discussion too, I claim, Segundo is not really as controversial as he presented himself, or as others may make him out to be. I am convinced that what Segundo claimed about science based on Marx's work is substantially in agreement with traditional interpretations. Marxism is primarily a methodology, and dialectical at that, so particular conclusions will change over time or be reformulated. Therefore, Marx's science as science is related to particular human values, especially justice and democracy.

Georg Lukács argued that the proletariat has greater access to truth through their science because the truth is not impartial in these questions. The tide of history is on the side of democracy and justice, and therefore on the side of the proletariat.²⁸ Segundo clearly agreed

with this position, though he phrased the issue a bit differently focusing on faith and values.

Then in an extended discussion of the relationship between dialectical materialism and historical materialism Segundo turned to Louis Althusser. Althusser was an even bigger advocate of the science of history developed by Marx. Where Segundo disagreed with Althusser was the question of the origin of the values behind the science. Althusser claimed that values come out of science and Segundo, obviously, argued that values are in some sense prior to the science and are the motivation for one's commitment to a particular science.²⁹ Further, as I mentioned above Segundo noted that Lenin discussed the interconnection between values and science in a similar manner.

So, what I hope to have demonstrated thus far is that science is a form of ideology in the way Segundo discussed these terms. That science, like all ideology, is intimately related to various human values and works to support and actualize those values. The values a person has inform their faith and this faith leads the individual to choose particular ideologies as a way of living. The faith that we call working class consciousness leads to the adoption of the ideology we call the science of historical materialism. And most importantly when Segundo talked about religion, as a form of ideology, he was advocating a religion that is substantially informed by the science of historical materialism. The difference between science and religion is that religion self-consciously incorporates the values behind both in a unified vision of human life, where science is specifically focused its subject area, in this case on the movement of history. From the discussion above, I think it is clear that this movement of history is vital to Segundo's religion, but as a theologian Segundo was also interested in religious life, qua religious life, which is to say social issues like ritual, celebration, and mourning; existential issues like meaning; and aesthetic issues like spirituality. Segundo was interested in the whole human person and the

whole society, his ontological focus was still historical and political but the human person exists as a complex actor in the struggles of history and politics.

RELIGION

Having established that religion must be informed by science, this leads to the real question of this paper, must religion adopt the methodology of historical materialism and become scientifically constructed? The reason I began this essay with an emphasis on Segundo's last book is that I think a reading of *Faith and Ideologies* implies that the answer to the above question might actually be found in his discussion of dialectical materialism as its own ontology, which would of course invite a direct confrontation between Segundo's theism and dialectical materialism's atheism. But Segundo actually negated this question by returning to his original focus, from *The Liberation of Theology*, on faith as deuterio-learning, learning to learn. My claim is that learning to learn is faith in science, in the dialectical method of historical materialism.

In *The Liberation of Theology* Segundo presented an understanding that seemed to be relatively neutral with regard to the question of the superior functionality of Christianity. He discussed the Christian faith and compared that with the Marxist faith and determined that both are equally functional. Then in *Faith and Ideologies* he seemed to go back to a position that did see Christianity as superior through a long discussion of the fact of Marx's atheism, and the necessity of dialectical materialism being an atheistic system or not. He rejected both of these claims through arguments that I personally did not find convincing. The trajectory seemed to be one in which his arguments for theism generally and Christianity in particular were getting stronger. Indeed the title and much of the text of *The Liberation of Dogma* imply a Christocentric position. That is not what it all comes to however.

The core of *The Liberation of Dogma* is a plea to adopt a scientific methodology with regard to religious life. Segundo argued, quite in line with his previous work, that our faith needs to involve a commitment to learn from previous generations. As a theologian his interest was in Christian dogma, in Christian scripture particularly. His point however was not that these represent superior sources, as that would ultimately contradict his whole argument. The Christian scripture, indeed any historical text (including Marx's writing for that matter) cannot be a "deposit" of wisdom. He had always argued that this was the basic and most dangerous error of Fundamentalism – muzzling the word of God. But here he is not so interested in the "word" of God as much as the pedagogy of God through the scriptures. Revelation is not the content; it is the process of inquiry. He said, "Like any other message transmitted by human beings, dogma ought to be well interpreted."³⁰ This is because, "...the central divine communication from which all dogma proceeds is made in language that is primarily 'iconic': myths, legends, narratives, and history." Here my discussion of iconic language bears fruit; the iconic touches us on the level of faith, and that is its importance, but what it means requires an interpretation. The scripture is not in digital language; to take it literally is an absurdity. And to think that an interpretation in one place or time will speak to all other places or times is equally absurd. Segundo argued that this is a core teaching of the church today,³¹ and is "...more worthy of God than the function of dictating."³² He wrote:

In somewhat more technical language, the idea is that one generation transmits to another not so much a "what to do if" but rather "epistemological premises" – that is guidelines for understanding what happens that enable the new generation to gradually acquire its own experience. This is an extraordinary saving of energy, but not when it is taken to the point of a "reaction" mechanically learned and practiced. It saves energy for the sake of experimentation.³³

The core argument here is that scripture offers, "... the process of a pedagogy that does not pile up items of information, but helps human beings go deeper into their problems...."³⁴ The

technical mechanism for this pedagogy is through a process of teaching us how to "punctuate" our experiences.³⁵ He explained that what we learn from experience has to do with where we put pauses in our internal narration of the events. If I pause, like putting a period at the end of a sentence, after a tragedy my lesson will focus on the tragic. If the pause is after the recovery from the tragedy, then the lesson involves recovery. All of which strikes me as eminently dialectical, reality keeps moving so the lessons have to do with where we pause for reflection. So the stories in the Bible offer examples of how to set about "punctuating" our lives.

Now all of this sounds Christo-centric, but that is not the whole story. What Segundo was saying is that great art generally serves this function. His contention is that Christian Dogma, indeed any form of dogma, must be liberated through the process he described. But the book is silent on the superiority question. In that regard he seemed to have given up that debate and was concentrating his attention on his own area, his own community. Further, he remarked, "Like everything dividing the churches, Catholic doctrine on the Bible is right, I believe, in one respect: the Bible does not become a human and rich norm except by becoming *tradition*."³⁶ My reading of this, coupled with the danger of attributing a divine character to the realm of instrumentality, and his point about the very human nature of this process by which each generation transmits guidelines for understanding experience, leads me to an open reading of the text in which the lesson is as clear for the non-Christian as it is for the Christian, it is just that his examples were all focused on his interests (the Catholic Church's use of dogma).³⁷ For example, the sources from which we learn how to learn are our iconic repositories; they are the great art and wisdom of the ages. It is important in this regard that Segundo did not argue that scripture was the sole source, only that it is a very good source as evidenced by the tradition, by previous generations seeing value in it and handing it on to the next.³⁸

Segundo concluded with observations such as: "However, it would be even worse if by passively accepting scattered and contradictory bits of information believers were to lose the experiential character (and hence the existential logic) of the message of Christ."³⁹ For my purposes here I think it is important to focus on the points about "experiential character" and the point about one generation's transmissions to the next. These points, I think, represent the scientific focus of Segundo's thought. In particular he was obviously concerned with the issue of methodology. The information that each generation passes down is not in the details but in the method. The important lessons in the scripture are also not in the details but in the method. We must learn how to learn, which is to say we must adopt the methodology of science in order to discover what we need to know as we go along, informed by the successes and failures of past generations. Learning to learn is a focus on method, and for his (and the masses of humanity's) liberationist purposes that method is the scientific method of historical materialism. So, religion must become not just a kind of science but that specific kind of science, subjecting itself to the methodology of science, to the openness to the future of science, and to the pragmatic standards of science (does it work?).

CONCLUSION

Assuming that the arguments above are convincing, and Segundo actually claimed that religion ought to be organized around the science of historical materialism, I think a more interesting question then presents itself. In what ways was Segundo's conception of religion based on historical materialism substantially different from Lenin's conception of the party based on dialectical materialism? In the Preface to *The Liberation of Dogma* Segundo has some very cryptic remarks about this being his last book, not being allowed to publish after this, etc. I think what he meant was that having fully developed this understanding I am articulating, and having

applied it directly to the Catholic Church, he expected to completely alienate the leadership of the Church. If I am correct, Segundo was saying that the Catholic Church, and indeed all churches and religious organizations, must become like the Marxist-Leninist version of the Communist Party if they are to exist honestly and fulfill their self described moral imperative. This is obviously an interpretation on my part, as his remarks were indeed cryptic. In a first read through of the book I was confused as to why he made them at all. But upon further reflection on the place that book occupies in his work generally I am left with the profound impression that this priest from Uruguay was telling religious people to be like the Communists (in an ideal sense, not that they should all go out and join the local party organization, which itself may or may not fit the ideal he was laying out).

This interpretation may not be as unique as it seems at first, after all the American priest known as Padre Guadalupe interpreted Segundo in just this way decades earlier. Fr. James Carney (his real name) was heavily influenced by the work of Segundo intellectually and morally. Carney cited Segundo's writings in his autobiography as being formative to the development of his thinking. In a chapter covering 1961, Carney wrote, "Some years later in Honduras, on reading the theology of Juan Luís Segundo, S.J., I completed my personal synthesis of God's plan for this world."⁴⁰ The reference is toward God's plan for justice. And in fact he specifically mentions having read and made pastoral use of virtually all of Segundo's writing through the time of his death in 1983.⁴¹ He also listed Segundo's conclusions as the major intellectual force behind his decision to join a group of Honduran revolutionaries in Nicaragua in 1983. In Carney's words, "My studies of [Teilhard de] Chardin and Juan Luís Segundo made it clear to me that God's plan for the evolution of this world and of human society is obviously dialectical, involving conflict and at times even armed revolution."⁴² This decision

was fatal to Carney, as he was captured entering Honduras with a group of 97 rebels and was executed by Honduran Special Forces. Carney's position was that the revolutionaries were on the side of justice and God, and therefore should have the support of clergy just as the regular army did. He said that "to be a Christian is to be a revolutionary."⁴³

I mention this story because I would like to conclude with some thoughts about what it means to take Segundo seriously and move towards a scientifically constructed religion. Padre Guadalupe is in some sense the model for this construction, certainly for the model of the role of the clergy. I observed above a sense in which the clergy is analogous to the party, but this is not a strict identity. Carney joined the revolutionaries (which is strictly identical with the party in this context), not to be a soldier but to minister to the soldiers. He did not see himself shooting people, that was not his role. In the party sense, I would say that he did not see himself as a party leader, in the political leadership of the vanguard of the working class. But his involvement was equally deep, I think, and equally important.

So, my conclusion on this issue is that the role of the clergy is the cultivation of the religious side of being human in the midst of struggle. This religious side is the part of our selves that is emotive and emotional, the part that communicates primarily in the iconic realm. Other aspects of our lived experience certainly involve iconic communication, but the religious side is primarily iconic. Thus religion has always made such pervasive use of ritual and art; by this I mean music, paintings, stained glass, sculpture, architecture, food, wine, ceremony, dance, and more. The clergy cultivates the aesthetic, existential and social aspects of being human.⁴⁴ The direct overlap with the social sciences is with the social aspect that is directly informed by social and political philosophy, psychology, sociology, and anthropology. And Segundo's point was that all of religion must be analyzed scientifically in order to guide our praxis. But this

praxis is not just the construction of religion; it is vital in the construction of the New Humanity. Thus the larger scientific analysis is immediately relevant, in the ways Segundo discussed it because our praxis must not only respond to our lived reality, but also anticipate developments and coordinate praxis proactively. The whole project of human existence points towards justice, or in Carney's words; it is God's plan. God aside, the trajectory towards justice that inspired Carney is the same trajectory Marx and Engels were talking about, that motivated Lenin and Che, Althusser and Lukács, Juan Luís Segundo and countless others. Justice is the human project, and thus the project of religion (cultivating the human "spirit" in the course of struggle), and the science of historical materialism is the tool for its realization. That is what Segundo was trying to teach us.

Notes

- ¹ Juan Luís Segundo, *Faith and Ideologies* (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1984): 50.
- ² Marsha Aileen Hewitt, *From Theology to Social Theory: Juan Luís Segundo and the Theology of Liberation* (New York: Peter Lang, 1990): 8.
- ³ Marx's XI Thesis on Feuerbach.
- ⁴ Hewitt, 13.
- ⁵ Segundo, *Faith and Ideologies*, 95. Marx uses "consciousness" as a synonym for "ideology," my point is that the particular class perspective is where the element of what Segundo calls "faith" comes in.
- ⁶ Hewitt, 13-14.
- ⁷ Frederick Engels, "Socialism: Utopian and Scientific" was originally part of the larger book *Anti-Dühring* which can be found in Volume 25 of Karl Marx and Frederick Engels *Collected Works* (New York: International Publishers, 1987). Engels commented in the Introduction to the English edition that this book was the most widely translated of any of his or Marx's work up to that time.
- ⁸ Clearly Segundo is saying that objectivity is a charade that covers class position. I would interpret this emphasis on science from Segundo to be more about a relative objectivity in the sense of unemotional confrontation with the facts as they can be gathered and understood.
- ⁹ Juan Luís Segundo, *The Liberation of Theology* (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1976): Chapter Four.
- ¹⁰ Segundo develops the interconnections between faith, values, and ideologies in *Faith and Ideologies*, particularly Chapter III.
- ¹¹ For Hewitt the move is not responsibly grounded in that Marx and even Lukács would have rejected it, see pages 66-67.
- ¹² Hewitt, 48, quoting *Faith and Ideologies*, 107. Here and in what follows I do not distinguish between my use of "values" and Segundo's "values-structure."
- ¹³ The claim of superiority seems clear in some places, but I think eventually drops out of Segundo's discussion. I return to this question below.
- ¹⁴ Hewitt, 70, quoting Marx.
- ¹⁵ Hewitt, 71.
- ¹⁶ Segundo himself discusses Geertz' work in *Faith and Ideologies* (see page 35) in order to solidify his position.
- ¹⁷ This analysis is adapted from: Richard Curtis, "The Essence of Religion: Homo Religiosus in a Dialectical Material World," **Nature, Society, and Thought**, Volume 11, Number 3 (1998): 311-330.
- ¹⁸ Specifically in *Faith and Ideologies*.
- ¹⁹ Bryan P. Stone, *Effective Faith: A Critical Study of the Christology of Juan Luís Segundo* (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1994): 46.
- ²⁰ See Stone, 51, and Segundo, *Liberation of Theology*, 121.
- ²¹ This discussion of iconic verse digital language is introduced here because it fits with the discussion of Stone, but its full relevance for the paper comes out below.
- ²² This language comes out in *Faith and Ideologies*, Chapter VI, and Stone, pp56-60.
- ²³ Stone, 59.
- ²⁴ Segundo objected to the "material" part of dialectical materialism, but was very interested in the dialectical methodology of historical materialism. See Segundo, *Faith and Ideologies*, Chapter IX particularly.
- ²⁵ This part of the discussion draws especially on Chapter IV of *Faith and Ideologies*.
- ²⁶ Segundo, *Faith and Ideologies*, 100.
- ²⁷ Segundo, *Faith and Ideologies*, 101.
- ²⁸ Segundo, *Faith and Ideologies*, 246.
- ²⁹ Segundo, *Faith and Ideologies*, 241.
- ³⁰ Segundo, *Liberation of Dogma*, 7.
- ³¹ Segundo, *Liberation of Dogma*, 76, referring to *Dei Verbum* from Vatican II.
- ³² Segundo, *Liberation of Dogma*, 41.
- ³³ Juan Luís Segundo, *The Liberation of Dogma* (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1992): 176.
- ³⁴ Segundo, *Liberation of Dogma*, 41.
- ³⁵ Segundo, *Liberation of Dogma*, 48.
- ³⁶ Segundo, *Liberation of Dogma*, 203.

Notes

³⁷ This point is weaker than Segundo admitted, in that various class interests will participate in the process of handing down iconic repositories, including the ruling class. This is related to the point the English theologian Daphne Hampson makes in her feminist and Marxist critique of the Bible as unredeemable for liberative purposes, for example see her essays in: Daphne Hampson, ed., *Swallowing a Fishbone? Feminist Theologians Debate Christianity* (London: SPCK, 1996). The issue of resolving Hampson's critique with Segundo's is interesting but beyond the scope of this project.

³⁸ This is the weakest part of my argument in that Segundo did equivocate on the issues I cite. I think my interpretation is the most reasonable given the totality of his comments in this and other books, but one could take the whole of just page 203 and make the reverse argument. Further, any other interpretation would be incoherent given Segundo's general argument. I don't think, for example, that he would dispute the value of the Upanishads given their even longer tradition.

³⁹ Segundo, *Liberation of Dogma*, 263.

⁴⁰ Padre J. Guadalupe Carney, *To Be A Revolutionary* (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1985): 120.

⁴¹ Carney, 288, 290.

⁴² Carney, 312.

⁴³ Carney, inscription to: *To Be A Revolutionary*.

⁴⁴ See the Curtis article (referenced above) for a full discussion of this analysis of religiosity.